

# **EXHIBIT A**

**LAW OFFICES OF DALE K. GALIPO**

Dale K. Galipo, Esq. (SBN 144074)  
dalekgalipo@yahoo.com  
Marcel F. Sincich, Esq. (SBN 319508)  
msincich@galipolaw.com  
21800 Burbank Boulevard, Suite 310  
Woodland Hills, CA 91367  
Phone: (818) 347-3333  
Fax: (818) 347-4118

**LAW OFFICES OF GRECH & PACKER**

Trenton C. Packer (SBN 241057)  
tpacker@grechpackerlaw.com  
7095 Indiana Ave Ste 200  
Riverside, CA 92506  
Phone: (951) 682-9311

*Attorneys for Plaintiff*

**SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA  
COUNTY OF RIVERSIDE**

EDGAR SOLIS,

Plaintiff,

vs.

COUNTY OF RIVERSIDE; STATE  
OF CALIFORNIA; SALVADOR  
WALTERMIRE, and DOES 1-10,  
inclusive,

Defendants.

Case No.: CVSW2301085

**COMPLAINT FOR DAMAGES**

1. Fourth Amendment—Excessive Force (42 U.S.C. §1983)
2. Municipal Liability—Ratification (42 U.S.C. §1983)
3. Municipal Liability—Inadequate Training (42 U.S.C. §1983)
4. Municipal Liability—Unconstitutional Custom, Practice, or Policy (42 U.S.C. §1983)
5. Battery
6. Negligence
7. Violation of Cal. Civil Code §52.1

**DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL**

1 **COMPLAINT FOR DAMAGES**

2 COME NOW, Plaintiff EDGAR SOLIS, for his Complaint against Defendants  
3 COUNTY OF RIVERSIDE; STATE OF CALIFORNIA; DEPUTY SALVADOR  
4 WALTERMIRE; and DOES 1-10, inclusive, and allege as follows:

5  
6 **JURISDICTION AND VENUE**

7 1. This Court has jurisdiction over the present matter because, as delineated  
8 herein, the nature of the claims and the amount in controversy meet the requirements  
9 for jurisdiction in the Superior Court of the State of California.

10 2. Venue is proper in this Court under Section 395(a) of the California  
11 Code of Civil Procedure because Defendants reside in the County of Riverside and  
12 all incidents, events, and occurrences giving rise to this action occurred in the County  
13 of Riverside, California.

14  
15 **INTRODUCTION**

16 3. This civil rights and state tort action arises out of the March 2, 2022, use  
17 of excessive and unreasonable force, including deadly force, on Plaintiff EDGAR  
18 SOLIS by Defendant Deputy SALVADOR WALTERMIRE, a COUNTY OF  
19 RIVERSIDE Sheriff's Deputy, and Defendant DOES 7-10, STATE OF  
20 CALIFORNIA Highway Patrol Officers. Plaintiff seeks compensatory damages,  
21 punitive damages, attorneys' fees, and costs from Defendants for violating various  
22 rights guaranteed to Plaintiff by the Bill of Rights, the United States Constitution, the  
23 California Constitution, and the laws of the State of California.

24 4. Defendants SALVADOR WALTERMIRE and DOES 1-10, inclusive,  
25 caused various injuries by directly shooting Plaintiff who was not an immediate  
26 threat of death or serious bodily injury as described herein, and/or by integrally  
27 participating or failing to intervene in the use of excessive and unreasonable force  
28 used against Plaintiff.







1 employee or agent of COUNTY, subject to the oversight and supervision of  
2 COUNTY'S elected and non-elected officials. At all relevant times, Defendant  
3 WALTERMIRE acted under color of law, to wit, under the color of the statutes,  
4 ordinances, regulations, policies, customs, and usages of Defendant COUNTY, the  
5 RCSD, and under the color of the statutes and regulations of the State of California.  
6 At all relevant times, Defendant WALTERMIRE acted within the course and scope  
7 of his employment as a CITY police officer. On information and belief, Defendant  
8 WALTERMIRE is and was at all relevant times a resident of this judicial district.  
9 Defendant WALTERMIRE used excessive and unreasonable deadly force against  
10 Plaintiff SOLIS.

11 9. At all relevant times, Defendants DOES 1-4 ("DOE DEPUTIES") are  
12 Sheriff's Deputies for the RCSD, including but not limited to patrol deputies, crisis  
13 negotiations officers, corporals, sergeants, field training officers, dispatchers, and  
14 other deputies and agent of RCSD. DOE DEPUTIES were acting under color of law  
15 within the course and scope of their duties as officers for the RCSD. DOE  
16 DEPUTIES were acting with complete authority and ratification of their principal,  
17 Defendant COUNTY.

18 10. Defendants DOES 5-6 ("DOE SUPERVISORS") are supervisory  
19 officers, officials, agents, and/or employees for the RCSD who were acting under  
20 color of law within the course and scope of their duties as officials for the RCSD.  
21 DOE SUPERVISORS were acting with complete authority and ratification of their  
22 principal, Defendant COUNTY. Defendants DOE SUPERVISORS are managerial,  
23 supervisorial, and policymaking employees of the RCSD, who were acting under  
24 color of law within the course and scope of their duties as managerial, supervisorial,  
25 and policymaking employees for the RCSD. DOE SUPERVISORS were acting with  
26 complete authority and ratification of their principal, Defendant COUNTY.

27 11. At all relevant times, Defendant STATE OF CALIFORNIA ("STATE")  
28 has the capacity to be sued. STATE is responsible for the actions, omissions, policies,



1 procedures, practices, and customs of its various agents and agencies, including the  
2 California Highway Patrol ("CHP") and its agents and employees. At all relevant  
3 times, Defendant STATE was responsible for assuring that the actions, omissions,  
4 policies, procedures, practices, and customs of the CHP and its employees and agents  
5 complied with the laws of the United States and of the State of California. At all  
6 relevant times, STATE was the employer of Defendant DOES 7-10, inclusive.  
7 Defendant STATE and CHP are not being sued individually or directly by this action  
8 but are parties to this action under the theory of respondeat superior as Defendant  
9 STATE is vicariously liable for the actions of its CHP officers.

10 12. At all relevant times, Defendant DOES 7-10 ("DOE OFFICERS") were  
11 and are duly appointed CHP officers and/or employees or agents of Defendant  
12 STATE, including but not limited to patrol officers, crisis negotiations officers,  
13 corporals, sergeants, and field training officers, subject to the oversight and  
14 supervision of STATE'S elected and non-elected officials. At all relevant times, DOE  
15 OFFICERS acted under color of law, to wit, under the color of the statutes,  
16 ordinances, regulations, policies, customs, and usages of Defendant STATE, the  
17 CHP, and under the color of the statutes and regulations of the State of California. At  
18 all relevant times, DOE OFFICERS acted within the course and scope of his  
19 employment as a STATE officer. On information and belief, DOE OFFICERS are  
20 and were at all relevant times residents of this judicial district. Defendant DOE  
21 OFFICERS used excessive and unreasonable deadly force against Plaintiff SOLIS.  
22 This action is being brought against Defendant DOE OFFICERS in their individual  
23 capacity only.

24 13. The true names and capacities, whether individual, corporate,  
25 association or otherwise of Defendants DOES 1-10, inclusive, are unknown to  
26 Plaintiff, who otherwise sue these Defendants by such fictitious names. Plaintiff will  
27 seek leave to amend this complaint to show the true names and capacity of these  
28 Defendants when they have been ascertained. Each of the fictitiously named



1 Defendants is responsible in some manner for the conduct or liabilities alleged  
2 herein.

3 14. At all times mentioned herein, each and every defendant was the agent  
4 of each and every other defendant and had the legal duty to oversee and supervise the  
5 hiring, conduct, and employment of each and every defendant.

6 15. All the acts complained of herein by Plaintiff against Defendants were  
7 done and performed by said Defendants by and through their authorized agents,  
8 servants, and/or employees, all of whom at all relevant times herein were acting  
9 within the course, purpose, and scope of said agency, service, and/or employment  
10 capacity. Also, Defendants and their agents ratified all the acts complained herein.

11 16. All Defendants who are natural persons, including Defendants  
12 WALTERMIRE and DOES 1-10, inclusive, are sued in their individual capacity, and  
13 punitive damages are only being requested as to these Defendants only, and not  
14 Defendants COUNTY or STATE.

15 17. Pursuant to Cal. Govt. Code §815.2(a), Defendants COUNTY and  
16 STATE are vicariously liable for the nonfeasance and malfeasance of the individual  
17 Defendants, including Defendants WALTERMIRE and DOES 1-10, inclusive, as  
18 alleged by Plaintiff's state law claims. ("A public entity is liable for injury  
19 proximately caused by an act or omission of an employee of the public entity within  
20 the scope of his employment if the act or omission would, apart from this section,  
21 have given rise to a cause of action against that employee or his personal  
22 representative."). The individual Defendants, including Defendants WALTERMIRE  
23 and DOES 1-10, inclusive, are liable for their nonfeasance and malfeasance pursuant  
24 to Cal. Civ. Code §820(a). Defendant COUNTY and STATE are also liable pursuant  
25 to Cal. Govt. Code §815.6.

26 18. On or about July 22, 2022, Plaintiff served a comprehensive and timely  
27 government tort claim for damages with COUNTY and STATE pursuant to  
28 applicable sections of the California Government Code.



1        19. The COUNTY denied Plaintiff's claim on August 15, 2022. The STATE  
2 failed to respond to Plaintiff's claim and therefore it was deemed rejected by  
3 operation of law on September 5, 2022.

4  
5                    **FACTS COMMON TO ALL CLAIMS FOR RELIEF**

6        20. Plaintiff repeats and re-alleges each and every allegation in paragraphs 1  
7 through 19 of this Complaint with the same force and effect as if fully set forth  
8 herein.

9        21. On March 2, 2022, at approximately 4:09 p.m., at or around the 600  
10 block of Hillmer Drive, in the City of Hemet, County of Riverside, California,  
11 Defendants WALTERMIRE and DOES 1-10 used deadly force against Plaintiff  
12 SOLIS.

13        22. The use of deadly force against Plaintiff SOLIS by Defendants  
14 WALTERMIRE and DOES 1-10 was excessive and unreasonable because at the  
15 time deadly force was used, Plaintiff SOLIS was not an immediate threat of death or  
16 serious bodily injury to any person, no deadly force warning was given prior to the  
17 use of deadly force, and there were reasonable less-intrusive alternatives to the use  
18 of deadly force available to said Defendants.

19        23. Upon information and belief, Defendants WALTERMIRE, DOES 1-10  
20 were not responding to a serious or violent crime, the Defendants did not have any  
21 information that Plaintiff SOLIS had just committed or was about to commit a  
22 serious or violent crime and had no information that Plaintiff SOLIS had just  
23 harmed or was threatening to harm any person or law enforcement officer.

24        24. Upon information and belief, Plaintiff SOLIS was shot in the back by  
25 Defendant DOE OFFICERS.

26        25. The use of deadly force against Plaintiff SOLIS by Defendant DOE  
27 OFFICERS was excessive and unreasonable because immediately prior to and at the  
28 time of the use of deadly force: Plaintiff SOLIS was not an immediate threat of

1 death or serious bodily injury to any person; Plaintiff SOLIS was not given a verbal  
2 warning that deadly force was going to be used; and Defendant DOE OFFICERS  
3 had reasonable, less-intrusive alternatives to the use of deadly force at the time  
4 available to them, and failed to use those alternatives, and failed to exhaust those  
5 alternatives.

6 26. After he was shot, Plaintiff SOLIS fell to the floor, surrendered, and sat  
7 against a wall as he was severely wounded.

8 27. Thereafter, Defendants WALTERMIRE and DOE DEPUTIES charged  
9 through a fence gate, and Defendant WALTERMIRE dropped to the ground and  
10 immediately and indiscriminately fired rounds at Plaintiff SOLIS, striking him  
11 several times.

12 28. The use of deadly force against Plaintiff SOLIS by Defendant  
13 WALTERMIRE was excessive and unreasonable because immediately prior to and  
14 at the time of the use of deadly force: Plaintiff SOLIS was not an immediate threat  
15 of death or serious bodily injury to any person; Plaintiff SOLIS was not given a  
16 verbal warning that deadly force was going to be used; and Defendant  
17 WALTERMIRE had reasonable, less-intrusive alternatives to the use of deadly  
18 force at the time available to him, failed to use those alternatives, and failed to  
19 exhaust those alternatives.

20 29. Defendants unreasonably escalated the situation when they began using  
21 deadly force against Plaintiff SOLIS, causing him great fear, pain, and harm.

22 30. Throughout the incident, the Defendants displayed negligent tactics,  
23 prior to, during, and after their uses of deadly force, including, but not limited to  
24 their: positioning, planning, communication, use of force, escalating the situation,  
25 and failing to de-escalate the situation.

26 31. Further, Defendants' actions and inactions were unreasonable and in  
27 violation of basic officer training.

28



32. As a direct and proximate result of the individual Defendants' actions, omissions, misjudgments, including their use of excessive and unreasonable force, Plaintiff SOLIS was caused to suffer great physical and mental pain and suffering, harm, injury, damages, loss of enjoyment of life, and permanent injury.

### **FIRST CLAIM FOR RELIEF**

#### **Fourth Amendment —Excessive Force (42 U.S.C. §1983)**

(Plaintiff against Defendant WALTERMIRE and DOES 1-10)

33. Plaintiff repeats and re-alleges each and every allegation in paragraphs 1 through 32 of this Complaint with the same force and effect as if fully set forth herein.

34. The Defendant WALTERMIRE and DOES 1-10 were acting under the color of state law and within the course and scope of their employment.

35. Defendants WALTERMIRE and DOES 1-10 used excessive force against Plaintiff SOLIS when they fired lethal rounds, striking Plaintiff SOLIS. Defendants' unjustified shooting and other uses of force, deprived Plaintiff SOLIS of his right to be secure in his person against unreasonable searches and seizures as guaranteed to Plaintiff SOLIS under the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and applied to state actors by the Fourteenth Amendment.

36. Defendants violated Plaintiff SOLIS' Fourth Amendment rights when they used excessive and unreasonable force against Plaintiff SOLIS, firing several lethal rounds at him, when Plaintiff SOLIS was not an immediate threat of death or serious bodily injury at the time, there were other reasonable alternatives to the use of deadly force, and no verbal warning was given prior to the shots that deadly force would be used.

37. As a result of the foregoing, Plaintiff SOLIS suffered great physical and mental pain and suffering, loss of enjoyment of life, and permanent injury.



1        38. The conduct of Defendants was willful, wanton, malicious, and done  
 2 with reckless disregard for the rights and safety of Plaintiff SOLIS, and therefore  
 3 warrants the imposition of exemplary and punitive damages as to Defendants.

4        39. As a result of their misconduct, Defendants are liable for Plaintiff  
 5 SOLIS' injuries, either because they were integral participants in the use of excessive  
 6 force, or because they failed to intervene to prevent these violations.

7        40. Plaintiff SOLIS seeks compensatory and punitive damages.

8        41. Plaintiff SOLIS also seeks reasonable statutory attorneys' fees and costs.

## 9 10        **SECOND CLAIM FOR RELIEF**

### 11        **Municipal Liability – Ratification (42 U.S.C. § 1983)**

12        (Plaintiff against Defendants COUNTY and DOE SUPERVISORS)

13        42. Plaintiff repeats and re-alleges each and every allegation in paragraphs 1  
 14 through 41 of this Complaint with the same force and effect as if fully set forth  
 15 herein.

16        43. The Defendant WALTERMIRE, DOE DEPUTIES, and DOE  
 17 SUPERVISORS were acting under the color of state law and within the course and  
 18 scope of their employment with Defendant COUNTY and RCSD.

19        44. The acts of Defendants deprived Plaintiff SOLIS of his particular rights  
 20 under the United States Constitution as alleged herein.

21        45. Upon information and belief, a final policymaker, including DOE  
 22 SUPERVISORS, ratified Defendants acts and the bases for their actions. Upon  
 23 information and belief, the final policymaker knew of and specifically approved of  
 24 Defendants' conduct and the bases for them, including their actions and inactions,  
 25 pre-shooting tactics, and use of deadly force.

26        46. Upon information and belief, the written policies and basic officer  
 27 training with respect to the incident include that law enforcement officers are not to  
 28 use deadly force against an individual unless the individual poses an immediate risk

1 of death or serious bodily injury to the officers or others. The Defendants' actions  
2 deviated from these written policies and basic law enforcement training because  
3 Plaintiff SOLIS did not pose an immediate threat of death or serious bodily injury to  
4 the involved law enforcement officers or anyone else.

5 47. Upon information and belief, a final policymaker has determined (or will  
6 determine) that the acts of Defendants were "within policy," and have ratified  
7 multiple prior incidents of the use of excessive force, including excessive less-lethal  
8 force and deadly force.

9 48. Upon information and belief, the Defendant COUNTY approved of the  
10 Defendant WALTERMIRE and DOE DEPUTIES' actions and inactions, after which  
11 Defendant COUNTY officials, including DOE SUPERVISORS, found the  
12 Defendants' conduct was within the official policies of the Defendant COUNTY  
13 and/or consistent with COUNTY deputies' basic training. On information and belief,  
14 the basis for such approval was based on the Defendants' self-serving statements,  
15 despite evidence that Plaintiff SOLIS was not an immediate threat of death or serious  
16 bodily injury to anyone at the time the excessive force was used, reasonable  
17 alternatives were available, and no warning was given.

18 49. Upon information and belief, after this incident, Defendant  
19 WALTERMIRE and DOE DEPUTIES were not disciplined, reprimanded, retrained,  
20 provided additional training, suspended, or otherwise penalized in connection with  
21 their conduct in this incident.

22 50. Upon information and belief, the following are only a few examples of  
23 cases where the RCSD deputies were not disciplined, reprimanded, retrained,  
24 suspended, or otherwise penalized in connection with the underlying acts giving rise  
25 to the below lawsuits, which indicates that the COUNTY routinely ratifies such  
26 behavior:

- 27 a. In *A.F., et al. v. County of Riverside, et al.*, case number 5:15-cv-  
28 01603, Defendant COUNTY settled with the family of a man who



1 was attacked by a K-9 and shot by COUNTY sheriff's deputies.

- 2 b. In *Howard v. County of Riverside, et al.*, case number 5:12-cv-  
 3 00700, Defendant COUNTY argued that the use of deadly force  
 4 against an unarmed individual was reasonable; a federal jury found  
 5 otherwise and returned a verdict in favor of plaintiff, an unarmed  
 6 man who suffered a severe brain injury and partial paralysis after a  
 7 use of force by a COUNTY sheriff's deputy.
- 8 c. In *Travillion v. County of Riverside*, case number EDCV 14-0003  
 9 VAP (DTBx), the COUNTY settled with the family of a man who  
 10 was killed as a result of a use of force by a COUNTY Sheriff's  
 11 deputy.
- 12 d. In *Bosch v. County of Riverside*, case number EDCV 13-02352  
 13 (SVW) (FFM), the COUNTY settled with the family of an unarmed  
 14 man who was killed by a use of force by a COUNTY Sheriff's  
 15 deputy.
- 16 e. In *Castillo v. County of Riverside*, case number EDCV 13-00789  
 17 VAP (SPx), the COUNTY settled with the family of a man who was  
 18 killed by a use of force by a COUNTY sheriff's deputy.
- 19 f. In *Munoz v. County of Riverside*, case number RIC120794, plaintiff  
 20 argued that the involved COUNTY Sheriff's deputy used deadly  
 21 force against her son at a time when he posed no immediate threat.  
 22 The jury in that case returned a verdict in favor of plaintiff.
- 23 g. In *L.R., et al. v. County of Riverside, et al.*, case number 15-cv-  
 24 1767, Defendant COUNTY settled with the family of an unarmed  
 25 man who was killed by a use of force by a COUNTY Sheriff  
 26 deputy.

27 51. Upon information and belief, Defendant COUNTY, through its officials,  
 28 had either actual or constructive knowledge of the deficient policies, practices and



1 customs alleged herein. Despite having knowledge as stated herein, these Defendant  
 2 COUNTY officials condoned, tolerated and through actions and inactions thereby  
 3 ratified such deficient policies. In doing so, said Defendant COUNTY officials acted  
 4 with deliberate indifference to the foreseeable effects and consequences of these  
 5 deficient policies, including their policy of ratification, with respect to the  
 6 constitutional rights of Plaintiff SOLIS and other individuals similarly situated.

7 52. By perpetrating, sanctioning, tolerating, and ratifying the outrageous  
 8 conduct and other wrongful acts, Defendant COUNTY officials acted with  
 9 intentional, reckless, and callous disregard for the life and rights of Plaintiff SOLIS.  
 10 Furthermore, the policies, practices, and customs implemented, maintained, and still  
 11 tolerated by Defendant COUNTY and its officials were affirmatively linked to and  
 12 were a significantly influential force behind the injuries of Plaintiff SOLIS.

13 53. Accordingly, Defendants COUNTY and each are liable to Plaintiff for  
 14 compensatory damages under 42 U.S.C. §1983.

15 54. The conduct of the Defendant DOE SUPERVISORS was willful,  
 16 wanton, malicious, and done with reckless disregard for the rights and safety of  
 17 Plaintiff SOLIS, and therefore warrants the imposition of exemplary and punitive  
 18 damages as to the Defendant SUPERVISORS.

19 55. Plaintiff SOLIS seeks compensatory and punitive damages.

20 56. Plaintiff SOLIS also seeks reasonable statutory attorneys' fees and costs.

### 21 **THIRD CLAIM FOR RELIEF**

#### 22 **Municipal Liability – Failure to Train (42 U.S.C. §1983)**

23 (Plaintiff against Defendants COUNTY and DOE SUPERVISORS)

24 57. Plaintiff repeats and re-alleges each and every allegation in paragraphs 1  
 25 through 56 of this Complaint with the same force and effect as if fully set forth  
 26 herein.  
 27

28 58. The Defendant WALTERMIRE, DOE DEPUTIES, and DOE

1 SUPERVISORS were acting under the color of state law and within the course and  
2 scope of their employment with Defendant COUNTY and RCSD.

3 59. The acts of Defendants deprived Plaintiff SOLIS of his particular rights  
4 under the United States Constitution as alleged herein.

5 60. The training policies of Defendants COUNTY were not adequate to train  
6 its deputies to handle the usual and recurring situations with which they must deal.  
7 This includes training with respect to tactics, the use of force, including deadly force,  
8 de-escalation techniques, controlling deputy emotions and fears, inappropriate  
9 “shoot/don’t shoot” scenarios in training that promote the use of unreasonable force,  
10 and continually assessing a situation to justify every shot fired. In addition to failing  
11 to train deputies to safely handle obvious, recurring situations, Defendant COUNTY  
12 affirmatively chose a policy it knew was likely to lead to, and in fact had previously  
13 led to, deprivations of constitutional rights including unreasonable seizures in  
14 violation of the Fourth Amendment.

15 61. Defendants COUNTY and DOE SUPERVISORS were deliberately  
16 indifferent to the obvious consequences of its failure to train its deputies adequately,  
17 including training with respect to tactics, the use of force, including deadly force, and  
18 de-escalation techniques.

19 62. The failure of Defendant COUNTY to provide adequate training caused  
20 the deprivation of Plaintiff SOLIS’ rights by Defendants; that is, Defendants’ failure  
21 to train is so closely related to the deprivation of Plaintiff SOLIS’ rights as to be the  
22 moving force that caused the ultimate injury.

23 63. On information and belief, Defendant COUNTY failed to train  
24 Defendants properly and adequately, including regarding the following:

- 25 a. Not providing adequate time and resources for deputies to train  
26 when the training does exist, so that the deputies can rely on that  
27 training during incidents.  
28 b. Not enforcing the basic training standards, when they do exist, that



1 are designed to prevent deputies from using excessive and  
2 unreasonable force.

- 3 c. Not adequately providing recurring training so that deputies do not  
4 lose necessary perishable skills, and not re-training deputies who  
5 have used force in the field.
- 6 d. Effective communication to enable deputies to gain cooperation and  
7 voluntary compliance in stressful situations.
- 8 e. Effective communication as a basic element of the use of force; the  
9 goal of which to gain voluntary compliance without resorting to  
10 physical force, especially deadly force.
- 11 f. That the use of deadly force is the most serious decision a peace  
12 officer may ever have to make, and such a decision should be  
13 guided by the reverence for human life and used only when other  
14 means of control are unreasonable or have been exhausted.
- 15 g. Reverence for life as the foundation on which the use of deadly  
16 force rests. Deadly force is always the last resort to be used in the  
17 direst of circumstances. The authority to use deadly force is an  
18 awesome responsibility given to peace officers by the people who  
19 expect them to exercise that authority judiciously. In the law  
20 enforcement/community partnership, the expectation that peace  
21 officers are self-disciplined and accountable.
- 22 h. Self-control as one of a peace officer's greatest assets in dealing  
23 with a person or a situation.
- 24 i. Unreasonable fear includes overreactions to true potential threats as  
25 well as reactions to unreal threats based on prejudice or poor  
26 application of experience.
- 27 j. Unreasonable fear can be responsible for inappropriate responses  
28 such as a failure to respond or responding inappropriately (using



1 unreasonable force).

- 2 k. Unreasonable force occurs when the type, degree, and duration of  
3 force employed was neither necessary nor appropriate.
- 4 l. The community expects that its peace officers will use only  
5 reasonable amounts of force and only use deadly force when  
6 absolutely necessary. Likewise, it expects that someone, including  
7 peace officers, will intervene if reasonable force is exceeded.
- 8 m. Use of other techniques to the use of deadly force including but are  
9 not limited to de-escalation, communication, conflict resolution,  
10 defensive tactics, less-lethal force, and use of time and distance.
- 11 n. That a deputies' subjective fear of future harm alone is insufficient  
12 as an imminent threat. An imminent threat is one that requires  
13 instant attention.
- 14 o. Training with respect to tactics.
- 15 p. Training with respect assessing when it is appropriate to use of  
16 force, including deadly force, and training on how much force is  
17 appropriate even when some force is appropriate.

18 64. Upon information and belief, the following are only a few examples of  
19 cases where the involved deputies were not disciplined, reprimanded, retrained,  
20 suspended, or otherwise penalized in connection with the underlying acts giving rise  
21 to the below lawsuits, which indicates that the County of Riverside failed to  
22 adequately train its deputies with regard to the use of force:

- 23 a. In *A.F., et al. v. County of Riverside, et al.*, case number 5:15-cv-  
24 01603, Defendant COUNTY settled with the family of a man who  
25 was attacked by a K-9 and shot by COUNTY sheriff's deputies.
- 26 b. In *Howard v. County of Riverside, et al.*, case number 5:12-cv-  
27 00700, Defendant COUNTY argued that the use of deadly force  
28 against an unarmed individual was reasonable; a federal jury found

1 otherwise and returned a verdict in favor of plaintiff, an unarmed  
 2 man who suffered a severe brain injury and partial paralysis after a  
 3 use of force by a COUNTY sheriff's deputy.

4 c. In *Travillion v. County of Riverside*, case number EDCV 14-0003  
 5 VAP (DTBx), the COUNTY settled with the family of a man who  
 6 was killed as a result of a use of force by a COUNTY Sheriff's  
 7 deputy.

8 d. In *Bosch v. County of Riverside*, case number EDCV 13-02352  
 9 (SVW)(FFM), the COUNTY settled with the family of an unarmed  
 10 man who was killed by a use of force by a COUNTY Sheriff's  
 11 deputy.

12 e. In *Castillo v. County of Riverside*, case number EDCV 13-00789  
 13 VAP (SPx), the COUNTY settled with the family of a man who was  
 14 killed by a use of force by a COUNTY sheriff's deputy.

15 f. In *Munoz v. County of Riverside*, case number RIC120794, plaintiff  
 16 argued that the involved COUNTY Sheriff's deputy used deadly  
 17 force against her son at a time when he posed no immediate threat.  
 18 The jury in that case returned a verdict in favor of plaintiff.

19 g. In *L.R., et al. v. County of Riverside, et al.*, case number 15-cv-  
 20 1767, Defendant COUNTY settled with the family of an unarmed  
 21 man who was killed by a use of force by a COUNTY Sheriff  
 22 deputy.

23 65. By reason of the aforementioned acts and omissions, Plaintiff SOLIS has  
 24 suffered past and future pain and suffering, loss of enjoyment of life, and permanent  
 25 injury.

26 66. Upon information and belief, Defendant COUNTY, through its officials,  
 27 had either actual or constructive knowledge of the deficient training policies,  
 28 practices and customs alleged herein. Despite having knowledge as stated herein,



1 these Defendant COUNTY officials condoned, tolerated and through actions and  
 2 inactions thereby ratified such deficient training. In doing so, Defendant COUNTY  
 3 officials acted with deliberate indifference to the foreseeable effects and  
 4 consequences of such deficient training with respect to the constitutional rights of  
 5 Plaintiff SOLIS and other individuals similarly situated.

6 67. Through its deficient training, Defendant COUNTY officials acted with  
 7 intentional, reckless, and callous disregard for the life and rights of Plaintiff SOLIS.  
 8 Furthermore, the deficient training tolerated by Defendant COUNTY and its officials  
 9 were affirmatively linked to and was a significantly influential force behind the  
 10 injuries of Plaintiff SOLIS.

11 68. Accordingly, Defendant COUNTY is liable to Plaintiff for  
 12 compensatory damages under 42 U.S.C. §1983.

13 69. The conduct of the Defendant DOE SUPERVISORS in condoning,  
 14 maintaining, and providing deficient training was willful, wanton, malicious, and  
 15 done with reckless disregard for the rights and safety of Plaintiff SOLIS, and  
 16 therefore warrants the imposition of exemplary and punitive damages as to the  
 17 Defendant SUPERVISORS.

18 70. Plaintiff SOLIS seeks compensatory and punitive damages.

19 71. Plaintiff SOLIS also seeks reasonable statutory attorneys' fees and costs

#### 20 21 **FOURTH CLAIM FOR RELIEF**

##### 22 **Municipal Liability – Unconstitutional Custom or Policy (42 U.S.C. § 1983)**

23 (Plaintiff against Defendants COUNTY and DOE SUPERVISORS)

24 72. Plaintiff repeats and re-alleges each and every allegation in paragraphs 1  
 25 through 71 of this Complaint with the same force and effect as if fully set forth  
 26 herein.

27 73. Defendants WALTERMIRE, DOE DEPUTIES, and DOE  
 28 SUPERVISORS were acting under the color of state law and within the course and

1 scope of their employment with Defendant COUNTY and RCSD.

2 74. Defendants acted pursuant to an expressly adopted official policy or a  
3 longstanding practice or custom of Defendant COUNTY.

4 75. On information and belief, Defendants were not disciplined,  
5 reprimanded, retrained, suspended, or otherwise penalized in connection with  
6 Plaintiff SOLIS' harm.

7 76. Upon information and belief, in addition to those policies alleged above,  
8 Defendants COUNTY and DOE SUPERVISORS maintained, inter alia, the  
9 following unconstitutional customs, practices, and policies:

- 10 a. Using excessive force, including excessive deadly force.
- 11 b. Providing inadequate training regarding the use of deadly force.
- 12 c. Employing and retaining as employees Defendants WALTERMIRE  
13 and DOE DEPUTIES, who Defendant COUNTY at all times  
14 material herein knew or reasonably should have known used  
15 excessive force.
- 16 d. Inadequately supervising, training, controlling, assigning, and  
17 disciplining COUNTY deputies, and other personnel, including  
18 Defendants WALTERMIRE and DOE DEPUTIES, who Defendant  
19 COUNTY knew or in the exercise of reasonable care should have  
20 known had the propensities to use excessive force.
- 21 e. Maintaining grossly inadequate procedures for reporting,  
22 supervising, investigating, reviewing, disciplining, and controlling  
23 misconduct by COUNTY officials, Defendants WALTERMIRE and  
24 DOE DEPUTIES.
- 25 f. Failing to adequately discipline COUNTY deputies, including  
26 Defendants WALTERMIRE and DOE DEPUTIES, for the above-  
27 referenced categories of misconduct, including "slaps on the wrist,"  
28 discipline that is so slight as to be out of proportion to the



1 magnitude of the misconduct, and other inadequate discipline that is  
2 tantamount to encouraging misconduct.

3 g. Announcing that unjustified shootings are “within policy,” including  
4 shootings that were later determined in court to be unconstitutional.

5 h. Even where shootings are determined in court to be  
6 unconstitutional, refusing to discipline, terminate, or retrain the  
7 officers involved.

8 i. Encouraging, accommodating, or facilitating a “blue code of  
9 silence,” “blue shield,” “blue wall,” “blue curtain,” “blue veil,” or  
10 simply “code of silence,” pursuant to which officials do not report  
11 other officials’ errors, misconduct, or crimes. Pursuant to this code  
12 of silence, if questioned about an incident of misconduct involving  
13 another official, while following the code, the official being  
14 questioned will claim ignorance of the other officials’ wrongdoing.

15 j. Maintaining a policy of inaction and an attitude of indifference  
16 towards soaring numbers of law enforcement shootings, including  
17 by failing to discipline, retrain, investigate, terminate, and  
18 recommend officials for criminal prosecution who participate in  
19 unreasonable shootings.

20 k. Upon information and belief, COUNTY, including but not limited  
21 to RCSD, has an unofficial policy, practice and/or custom of finding  
22 almost all—if not all—of its deputy involved shootings to be within  
23 policy, of not disciplining its deputies involved in shootings, not  
24 retraining or firing deputies involved in shootings, and of not  
25 recommending criminal charges against their deputies involved in  
26 excessive and unreasonable deputy-involved shootings. As a result,  
27 deputies involved in excessive uses of deadly force are allowed back  
28 to patrol the streets even though COUNTY knew, or should have

1 known, that these deputies have a propensity for using excessive  
2 deadly force against the citizens that the deputies are supposed to  
3 protect and serve, especially against minorities and the mentally ill.

4 1. Upon information and belief, as a result of COUNTY policy,  
5 custom and/or practices, RCSD deputies know that if they use  
6 deadly excessive force against someone, they will not be disciplined  
7 and their use of force will be found within policy, which results in a  
8 significant number of COUNTY deputies being involved in  
9 numerous shootings. This policy, custom and/or practice was  
10 established by supervising and managerial employees of COUNTY,  
11 specifically, those employees tasked with determining whether  
12 deputy-involved shootings fall within policy, those employees  
13 responsible for disciplining, retraining, and firing employees who  
14 use excessive force, and for those employees responsible for making  
15 recommendations of criminal charges being filed against deputies  
16 who use excessive deadly force; and

17 m. Upon information and belief, this policy, custom and/or practice  
18 long lasting and persistent, and existed well before Plaintiff SOLIS  
19 was shot by Defendants WALTERMIRE and DOE DEPUTIES.  
20 This policy, custom and/or practice was established so that  
21 COUNTY deputies do not bear the responsibility for the people that  
22 they use excessive deadly force against. This policy, custom and/or  
23 practice exists so that the public does not have such a negative  
24 perception of COUNTY and its sheriff's department and so that  
25 COUNTY can avoid the repercussions associated with its deputies'  
26 use of excessive deadly force against citizens, including negative  
27 publicity, avoiding criminal prosecution, and avoiding civil liability.  
28 A significant reason that this policy, custom and/or practice was



1 established was to avoid COUNTY being liable, under a theory of  
2 vicarious liability, for the uses of excessive and unreasonable deadly  
3 force by its employees. In other words, there is a large financial  
4 incentive for COUNTY to erroneously determine that most, if not  
5 all, of its deputies' uses of deadly force are within policy. If  
6 COUNTY, through its policymakers and supervisors, would admit  
7 that their deputies were at fault for using excessive and  
8 unreasonable deadly force, then COUNTY is aware of how much  
9 they would have to pay for any associated litigation.

10 77. Defendants COUNTY and DOE SUPERVISORS, together with various  
11 other officials, whether named or unnamed, had either actual or constructive  
12 knowledge of the deficient policies, practices and customs alleged in the paragraphs  
13 above. Despite having knowledge as stated above, these Defendants condoned,  
14 tolerated and through actions and inactions thereby ratified such policies. Said  
15 Defendants also acted with deliberate indifference to the foreseeable effects and  
16 consequences of these policies with respect to the constitutional rights of Plaintiff  
17 SOLIS and other individuals similarly situated.

18 78. By perpetrating, sanctioning, tolerating, and ratifying the outrageous  
19 conduct and other wrongful acts, DOE SUPERVISORS acted with intentional,  
20 reckless, and callous disregard for the life of Plaintiff SOLIS and for Plaintiff SOLIS'  
21 constitutional rights. Furthermore, the policies, practices, and customs implemented,  
22 maintained, and still tolerated by Defendants COUNTY and DOE SUPERVISORS  
23 were affirmatively linked to and were a significantly influential force behind the  
24 injuries of Plaintiff SOLIS.

25 79. Based on information and belief, the following are only a few examples  
26 of cases evidencing Defendant COUNTY'S unconstitutional policies, where the  
27 involved deputies were not disciplined, reprimanded, retrained, suspended, or  
28 otherwise penalized in connection with the underlying acts giving rise to the below

1 lawsuits, which indicates that the County of Riverside routinely ratifies such behavior  
 2 and maintains a practice of allowing such behavior:

- 3 a. In *A.F., et al. v. County of Riverside, et al.*, case number 5:15-cv-  
 4 01603, Defendant COUNTY settled with the family of a man who  
 5 was attacked by a K-9 and shot by COUNTY sheriff's deputies.
- 6 b. In *Howard v. County of Riverside, et al.*, case number 5:12-cv-  
 7 00700, Defendant COUNTY argued that the use of deadly force  
 8 against an unarmed individual was reasonable; a federal jury found  
 9 otherwise and returned a verdict in favor of plaintiff, an unarmed  
 10 man who suffered a severe brain injury and partial paralysis after a  
 11 use of force by a COUNTY sheriff's deputy.
- 12 c. In *Travillion v. County of Riverside*, case number EDCV 14-0003  
 13 VAP (DTBx), the COUNTY settled with the family of a man who  
 14 was killed as a result of a use of force by a COUNTY Sheriff's  
 15 deputy.
- 16 d. In *Bosch v. County of Riverside*, case number EDCV 13-02352  
 17 (SVW)(FFM), the COUNTY settled with the family of an unarmed  
 18 man who was killed by a use of force by a COUNTY Sheriff's  
 19 deputy.
- 20 e. In *Castillo v. County of Riverside*, case number EDCV 13-00789  
 21 VAP (SPx), the COUNTY settled with the family of a man who was  
 22 killed by a use of force by a COUNTY sheriff's deputy.
- 23 f. In *Munoz v. County of Riverside*, case number RIC120794, plaintiff  
 24 argued that the involved COUNTY Sheriff's deputy used deadly  
 25 force against her son at a time when he posed no immediate threat.  
 26 The jury in that case returned a verdict in favor of the plaintiff.
- 27 g. In *L.R., et al. v. County of Riverside, et al.*, case number 15-cv-  
 28 1767, Defendant COUNTY settled with the family of an unarmed



1 man who was killed by a use of force by a COUNTY Sheriff  
2 deputy.

3 h. In *Arocha v. County of Riverside, et al.*, case number 18-CV-01585,  
4 Defendant COUNTY settled with an unarmed man who was beaten  
5 unconscious and suffered a traumatic brain injury as a result of force  
6 by COUNTY Sheriff's deputies.

7 80. By reason of the aforementioned acts and omissions, Plaintiff SOLIS has  
8 suffered past and future pain and suffering, loss of enjoyment of life, and permanent  
9 injury.

10 81. Accordingly, Defendant COUNTY is liable to Plaintiff for  
11 compensatory damages under 42 U.S.C. §1983.

12 82. The conduct of the Defendant DOE SUPERVISORS in condoning,  
13 maintaining, and providing these longstanding unconstitutional policies, customs,  
14 and/or practices was willful, wanton, malicious, and done with reckless disregard for  
15 the rights and safety of Plaintiff SOLIS, and therefore warrants the imposition of  
16 exemplary and punitive damages as to the Defendant SUPERVISORS.

17 83. Plaintiff SOLIS seeks compensatory and punitive damages.

18 84. Plaintiff SOLIS also seeks reasonable statutory attorneys' fees and costs

### 19 20 **FIFTH CLAIM FOR RELIEF**

#### 21 **Battery (Cal. Govt. Code §820 and California Common Law)**

22 (Plaintiff against Defendants WALTERMIRE, DOE DEPUTIES, and DOE  
23 OFFICERS in their individual capacity, directly; and Defendants COUNTY and  
24 STATE vicariously)

25 85. Plaintiff repeats and re-alleges each and every allegation in paragraphs 1  
26 through 84 of this Complaint with the same force and effect as if fully set forth  
27 herein.  
28

1        86. Defendants WALTERMIRE, DOE DEPUTIES, and DOE OFFICERS,  
2 while working as officials for the RCSD and CHP respectively and acting within the  
3 course and scope of their duties, intentionally shot Plaintiff SOLIS multiple times and  
4 used unreasonable and excessive force against him.

5        87. The use of deadly force against Plaintiff SOLIS by Defendants was  
6 unreasonable because Plaintiff SOLIS did not pose an immediate threat of death or  
7 serious bodily harm to any person any the time, there were less lethal alternatives,  
8 and no verbal warning was given.

9        88. At all relevant times, Plaintiff SOLIS was not an immediate threat of  
10 bodily injury to anyone, including Defendants.

11        89. Plaintiff SOLIS never consented to the use of force used against him by  
12 Defendants.

13        90. Plaintiff SOLIS was harmed when he was shot multiple times, and  
14 experienced severe pain and suffering, injury, and damages.

15        91. The Defendants' use of unreasonable force, including deadly force, was  
16 the direct cause, proximate cause, and only cause of Plaintiff SOLIS' pain and  
17 suffering, injury, harm, and damages. In other words, the unreasonable force was at  
18 least a substantial factor in causing Plaintiff SOLIS' pain and suffering, injury, harm,  
19 and damages.

20        92. Defendants caused various injuries as mentioned herein and are liable  
21 either because they directly harmed Plaintiff SOLIS or integrally participated in or  
22 failed to intervene in the incident, and engaged in other acts and/or omissions around  
23 the time of the incident. Defendants' acts and omissions resulted in harmful and  
24 offensive touching of Plaintiff SOLIS.

25        93. Defendants are directly liable for their actions and inactions pursuant to  
26 Cal. Govt. Code §820(a).

27        94. Defendants COUNTY and STATE are vicariously liable for the  
28 wrongful acts of their employees, including Defendants WALTERMIRE, DOE



1 DEPUTIES, and DOE OFFICERS pursuant to section 815.2(a) of the California  
 2 Government Code, which provides that a public entity is liable for the injuries caused  
 3 by its employees within the scope of the employment if the employee's act would  
 4 subject him or her to liability.

5 95. The conduct of Defendants WALTERMIRE, DOE DEPUTIES, and  
 6 DOE OFFICERS was malicious, wanton, oppressive, and accomplished with a  
 7 conscious disregard for the rights of Plaintiff, entitling Plaintiff SOLIS to an award of  
 8 exemplary and punitive damages as to these Defendants.

9 96. Plaintiff SOLIS seeks compensatory damages, and punitive damages.

### 11 **SIXTH CLAIM FOR RELIEF**

#### 12 **Negligence (Cal. Govt. Code §820 and California Common Law)**

13 (Plaintiff against Defendants WALTERMIRE, DOE DEPUTIES, and DOE  
 14 OFFICERS in their individual capacity, directly; and Defendants COUNTY and  
 15 STATE vicariously)

16 97. Plaintiff repeats and re-alleges each and every allegation in paragraphs 1  
 17 through 96 of this Complaint with the same force and effect as if fully set forth  
 18 herein.

19 98. At all relevant times, Defendants WALTERMIRE, DOE DEPUTIES,  
 20 and DOE OFFICERS, were working as officials for the RCSD and CHP,  
 21 respectively, and acting under color of state law and within the course and scope of  
 22 their duties.

23 99. Peace officers, including Defendants, have a duty to use reasonable care  
 24 to prevent harm or injury to others. This duty includes using appropriate tactics,  
 25 giving appropriate commands, giving warnings, and not using any force unless  
 26 necessary, using less than lethal options, and only using deadly force as a last resort.  
 27 These duties also include providing proper training and equipment to officials so that  
 28 they may perform their duties in accordance with the department policies, properly

1 investigate use of force incidents, and punish, re-train, terminate, and/or prosecute  
2 violators of those policies and the law.

3 100. Defendants WALTERMIRE, DOE DEPUTIES, and DOE OFFICERS  
4 breached their duty of care by their conduct as alleged herein. Upon information and  
5 belief, the actions and inactions of Defendants were negligent and reckless, including  
6 but not limited to:

- 7 a. The failure to properly and adequately assess the need to use force  
8 or deadly force against Plaintiff SOLIS.
- 9 b. The negligent tactics and handling of the situation with Plaintiff  
10 SOLIS, including pre-shooting negligence.
- 11 c. The failure to properly train and supervise employees, both  
12 professional and non-professional, including Defendants  
13 WALTERMIRE and DOES 1-10.
- 14 d. The negligent handling of evidence and witnesses.
- 15 e. The negligent communication of information during the incident.

16 101. As a direct and proximate result of Defendants' conduct as alleged  
17 above, and other undiscovered negligent conduct, Plaintiff SOLIS was caused to  
18 suffer severe pain and suffering. In other words, the Defendants' negligence was at  
19 least a substantial factor in causing Plaintiff SOLIS' harm, injury, and damages.

20 102. At all relevant times, Plaintiff SOLIS was not an immediate threat of  
21 death or serious bodily injury to anyone, including Defendants, no warning was given  
22 that deadly force was going to be used prior to the use of deadly force, and less than  
23 lethal alternatives were available to Defendants.

24 103. Further, Plaintiff SOLIS' harm, specifically being shot by the  
25 Defendants when Plaintiff SOLIS was not an immediate threat of death or serious  
26 bodily injury to anyone, ordinarily would not have happened unless Defendants were  
27 negligent.

28



1           104. The harm inflicted by Defendants was caused by something that only the  
2 Defendants controlled. The Defendants had control over their firearms, as well as  
3 control over the tactical decisions made during the incident.

4           105. As a result of their misconduct, Defendants WALTERMIRE and DOES  
5 1-10 are liable for Plaintiff SOLIS' injuries, either because they were integral  
6 participants in their negligence, or because they failed to intervene to prevent these  
7 violations.

8           106. Pursuant to Cal. Gov't Code §820(a), "a public employee is liable for  
9 injury caused by his act or omission to the same extent as a private person."

10           107. Defendants COUNTY and STATE are vicariously liable for the  
11 wrongful acts of Defendants WALTERMIRE and DOES 1-10 pursuant to section  
12 815.2(a) of the California Government Code, which provides that a public entity is  
13 liable for the injuries caused by its employees within the scope of the employment if  
14 the employee's act would subject him or her to liability. Defendants COUNTY and  
15 STATE are vicariously liable under California law and the doctrine of *respondeat*  
16 *superior*.

17           108. Plaintiff seeks attorneys' fees under this claim pursuant to Cal. Code of  
18 Civ. Pro. §1021.5 for enforcement of the important rights effecting the public interest  
19 that Plaintiff, and those similarly situated, to be free from intimidation and physical  
20 assault by law enforcement as described herein.

21           109. Plaintiff SOLIS seeks compensatory damages, including general and  
22 special damages in an amount to be proven at trial.

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**SEVENTH CLAIM FOR RELIEF**

**Bane Act (Violation of Cal. Civil Code §52.1)**

(Plaintiff against Defendants WALTERMIRE, DOE DEPUTIES, and DOE OFFICERS in their individual capacity, directly; and Defendants COUNTY and STATE vicariously)

110. Plaintiff repeats and re-alleges each and every allegation in paragraphs 1 through 109 of this Complaint with the same force and effect as if fully set forth herein.

111. California Civil Code, Section 52.1 (the Bane Act), prohibits any person from using or attempting to use violent acts, threats, intimidation, or coercion to interfere with the exercise or enjoyment by any individuals' rights secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States, or of the rights secured by the Constitution or laws of this state in retaliation against another person for exercising that person's constitutional rights.

112. On information and belief, Defendants WALTERMIRE and DOES 1-10, while working for COUNTY and STATE and acting within the course and scope of their duties, intentionally committed, and attempted to commit acts of violence against Plaintiff SOLIS, including by shooting him without justification or excuse, and by integrally participating and failing to intervene in the above violence.

113. When Defendants used excessive and unreasonable force against Plaintiff SOLIS, they intentionally interfered with his civil rights to be free from excessive force.

114. Further, the Defendants used excessive and unreasonable force in violation of the Constitution with intent to deprive Plaintiff SOLIS of his Constitutional rights to be free from excessive force.

115. On information and belief, Defendants intentionally violated Plaintiff SOLIS' rights to be free from excessive force by demonstrating reckless disregard for his rights when Defendants shot Plaintiff SOLIS.



1           116. Defendants violated Plaintiff SOLIS' Constitutional right to be free from  
2 excessive and unreasonable force by peace officers. Defendants intended to violate  
3 Plaintiff SOLIS' rights and/or acted with reckless disregard with regard to Plaintiff  
4 SOLIS' Constitutional rights, which is evidence that they intended to violate Plaintiff  
5 SOLIS' rights.

6           117. The conduct of Defendants was a substantial factor in causing Plaintiff  
7 SOLIS' harms, losses, injuries, and damages.

8           118. Defendants COUNTY and STATE are vicariously liable for the  
9 wrongful acts of Defendants WALTERMIRE and DOES 1-10, their respective  
10 employees, pursuant to section 815.2(a) of the California Government Code, which  
11 provides that a public entity is liable for the injuries caused by its employees within  
12 the scope of the employment if the employee's act would subject him or her to  
13 liability. Defendants COUNTY and STATE are vicariously liable under California  
14 law and the doctrine of *respondeat superior*.

15           119. The conduct of the individual Defendants was malicious, wanton,  
16 oppressive, and accomplished with a conscious disregard for Plaintiff SOLIS' rights,  
17 justifying an award of exemplary and punitive damages as to those Defendants.

18           120. Plaintiff SOLIS seeks compensatory damages, punitive damages, costs,  
19 attorneys' fees, and treble damages under this claim.

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**PRAYER FOR RELIEF**

WHEREFORE, Plaintiff EDGAR SOLIS requests entry of judgment in his favor and against Defendants COUNTY OF RIVERSIDE, SALVADOR WALTERMIRE, STATE OF CALIFORNIA, and DOES 1-10, inclusive, as follows:

A. For compensatory damages in whatever other amount may be proven at trial, under federal and state law.

C. For punitive and exemplary damages against the individual defendants in an amount to be proven at trial.

D. For statutory damages.

F. For reasonable attorneys' fees, and treble damages, including litigation expenses.

G. For interests and costs of suit; and

H. For such further other relief as the Court may deem just, proper, and appropriate.

DATED: January 30, 2023

**LAW OFFICES OF DALE K. GALIPO**  
**LAW OFFICES OF GRECH & PACKER**

By: /s/ Marcel F. Sincich

Dale K. Galipo  
Trenton C. Packer  
Marcel F. Sincich  
*Attorneys for Plaintiff*



**DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL**

Plaintiff SOLIS hereby submits this demand that this action be tried in front  
of a jury.

DATED: January 30, 2023

**LAW OFFICES OF DALE K. GALIPO**  
**LAW OFFICES OF GRECH & PACKER**

By: /s/ Marcel F. Sincich

Dale K. Galipo  
Trenton C. Packer  
Marcel F. Sincich  
*Attorneys for Plaintiff*